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RECENT DECISIONS
obvious that were this case to be decided in accordance with the mo-
tives of the parties as the layman would determine them, and not by
the intent as expressed in the written agreement, the court would
be thrust upon the horns of an insurmountable dilemma. The law,
as it is administered today, through decisions and statutes, is not
primarily concerned with the motivating considerations which bring
parties into written contract. It is concerned only with the intent
of the parties as expressed in the instrument. 13 To require the
courts to inquire into extrinsic motives would throw the law of con-
tract and evidence into confusion.
If the harshness and somewhat arbitrary effect of the common
law rule as to the risk of loss problem in the sale of realty is to be
minimized, statutory direction should be the instrumentality adopted
to achieve such an end. It should be borne in mind, however, that
the statutory law is often more extremely opposed to the layman's
sense of justice than is the common law.
C. J. B., JR.
EQUITY - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WHERE No PROPERTY RIGHT
is VIoLATED.-Plaintifts, members of a religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses, seek injunctive relief against repeated arrests
and jailings under an unconstitutional city ordinance forbidding the
distribution of circulars, handbills and notices of meetings as viola-
tive of the sanitary code. Plaintiffs allege deprivation of their rights
of freedom of religion, speech, press and assembly, and inadequacy
of the remedy at law. The arrests and jailings are continuing not-
withstanding the fact that the defendant city officials, police chief
and trial judge know of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. A
demurrer by the defendants is predicated upon the absence of any
allegation of breach of a property right, and upon the claim that equity
will not interpose to prevent prosecution in the criminal courts.
Held, under special circumstances equity will grant an injunction even
in absence of injury to property rights. Kenyon v. City of Chicopee,
- Mass. -, 70 N. E. (2d) 241 (1946).
It was the rule at common law that equity would protect only
property rights,' which doctrine has been widely adhered to both in
England and in the United States. The modern trend, however, has
been to expand equity's jurisdiction to protect all rights recognized
in law. Generally speaking, those rights to which equity extends its
13 Gans v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 214 N. Y. 326 108 N. E. 443 (1915);
Goldstein v. Frances Emblems, 269 App. Div. 349, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 740
(1st Dep't 1945).
1 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
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protection are not limited to specific tangible property, but include,
in proper cases, protection of such intangibles as the right to carry
on a business, 2 and the right to protect trade secrets.3 In such cases,
the primary requisite for injunctive relief i the inadequacy of the
remedy at law. Can it be said that the remedy at law is any more
adequate when a personal right is invaded?
Recent decisions in several states, 4 as well as the writings of the
late Mr. Justice Brandeis,5 Dean Pound 6 and Prof. Chaffee 7 em-
phasize the illogical reasoning in the failure to protect those personal
rights recognized in law, when such rights are no less important
to the individual and to society than are the property rights which
are protected. Equity's extraordinary remedies should be available
to all who can bring themselves within three basic requisites: (1)"a
substantial right will be materially impaired unless the remedy is
granted; (2) the remedy at law is inadequate; (3) enforcement of
the decree will place no impossible burden upon the court.
The court disposes of defendants' second claim by holding that
equity will interpose to restrain prosecution in a criminal court under
an unconstitutional ordinance where plaintiff would be subjected to
harassment by vexatious litigation affecting those rights which equity
protects.8
New York courts have not as yet recognized the merits of this
reasoning. Injunctive relief will be granted only in the protection
of a right of property, even where the result would be to subject the
defendant to harassing litigation. 9 The general trend, however, has
been to exercise extreme liberality in determining the existence of a
right which equity will protect, thereby bringing many which can
be called property rights only with difficulty into the lifie of decisions
enabling equity to decree injunctive relief.10
P. L. H.
2 Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 885
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
3 Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampograph Co., 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E. 485 (1923).
'Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919); accord, EX parte
Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899); see Vanderbilt v.
Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 919, 67 At. 97, 100 (1907).
5 Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
6 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defanation and Injuries to Person-
ality 29 HAgv. L. REv. 640 (1916).
7 Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, 34 HARv. L. R.v. 388,
407 (1921).
8 Shuman v. Gilbert, 229 Mass. 225, 118 N. E. 254 (1918).9 Biddles, Inc. v. Enright, 239 N. Y. 354, 146 N. E. 625 (1925).
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